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Quantum samplers are believed capable of sampling efficiently from distributions that are clas-
sically hard to sample from. We consider a sampler inspired by the classical Ising model. It is
nonadaptive and therefore experimentally amenable. Under a plausible conjecture, classical sam-
pling upto additive errors from this model is known to be hard. We present a trap-based verification
scheme for quantum supremacy that only requires the verifier to prepare single-qubit states. The
verification is done on the same model as the original sampler, a square lattice, with only a constant
overhead. We next revamp our verification scheme in two distinct ways using fault tolerance that
preserves the nonadaptivity. The first has a lower overhead based on error correction with the same
threshold as universal quantum computation. The second has a higher overhead but an improved
threshold (1.97%) based on error detection. We show that classically sampling upto additive errors
is likely hard in both these schemes. Our results are applicable to other sampling problems such
as the Instantaneous Quantum Polynomial-time (IQP) computation model. They should also assist
near-term attempts at experimentally demonstrating quantum supremacy and guide long-term ones.
I. INTRODUCTION
Considerable experimental efforts are being directed to-
wards the realisation of quantum information processing
technologies, with the eventual aim of constructing uni-
versal quantum computers and simulators [1–4]. One of
the motivations for this exercise is their expected abil-
ity to simulate physical systems that are believed to be
intractable classically [5, 6]. An example of such a sys-
tem is a lattice of interacting spins in the presence of a
magnetic field, represented by the classical Ising model
[7]. The Ising model is a workhorse in condensed mat-
ter physics, employed to study magnetic properties of
spin glasses [8] and spin liquids [9] as well as phase tran-
sitions in many-body systems such as lattice gases [10],
and numerous other problems. The partition function is a
quantity central to most of these studies. Computing the
partition function (and ground state) of the Ising model
in an external magnetic field is, however, NP-hard even
in two dimensions [11], and approximating it up to mul-
tiplicative errors is #P-hard [12, 13]. #P-hard problems
are not expected to be solvable efficiently on a universal
quantum computer.
Theoretical results suggest that sampling up to multi-
plicative [14–17] and additive [18–23] errors from certain
distributions hold the possibility of demonstrating ‘quan-
tum supremacy’ [24] in devices that do not require the
full complement of DiVincenzo’s criteria [25] for their im-
plementation. Their scalable implementation is thus an-
ticipated to be more achievable than a universal quantum
computer’s, providing tangible demonstrations of quan-
tum supremacy sooner [17, 26–29]. This expectation is
purchased at the price of sacrificing the full power of uni-
versal quantum computers, promising only to efficiently
sample from certain distributions instead. Among them
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is a non-universal quantum simulator based on a non-
adaptive translationally-invariant Ising model that allows
sampling from the distribution of classical Ising model
partition functions [20]. It shows, in line with other mod-
els [13, 15–17, 19], that under a plausible conjecture, a
highly unexpected collapse of the polynomial hierarchy
to the third level occurs if a classical sampler can sam-
ple the partition function distribution upto additive er-
rors. Unlike these models, however, the hardness results
of the Ising sampler [20] hold for a single fixed instance
of the problem, relieving the burden of creating random
instances.
We tackle two crucial challenges facing any experimental
demonstration of quantum supremacy for the Ising sam-
pler. The first is verifying that the output distribution is
indeed from the correct quantum sampler, as opposed to
a classical sampler emulating a similar distribution [30].
The second is ensuring that the sampling task remains
classically hard to simulate even in the presence of exper-
imental noise and decoherence [30]. A deeper question is
whether it is possible to demonstrate and verify quan-
tum supremacy fault-tolerantly in a manner that is less
demanding than universal quantum computation.
In this paper, we answer the above question in the af-
firmative by amalgamating trap-based quantum verifica-
tion techniques [31] with recent results on demonstrat-
ing quantum supremacy by emulating fault tolerance via
post-selection [29]. To answer the first challenge above,
we present a nonadaptive verification scheme with expo-
nentially low probability of failure and only linear com-
plexity for the Ising sampler (prover). Our scheme ap-
plies to any untrusted prover with entangling and mea-
suring capabilities, limited only by the laws of quantum
mechanics, and requires the verifier to prepare random,
single-qubit states with bounded local noise. We first
present a verification scheme that should aid demonstrat-
ing quantum supremacy with few qubits (Theorem 1).
We then prove fault-tolerant versions (Theorem 2), one
of which uses the idea of emulated fault tolerance by post-
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2selection [29]. This ‘free’ post-selection enables us to pro-
vide a fault-tolerant verification scheme with improved
thresholds over universal quantum computing thresholds.
An important property of our verification is that it itself
is within the instantaneous model of quatum computing
and therefore can be implemented in the same device as
the Ising sampler with small modifications.
We go beyond Ref. [31] in three ways, namely (i) pro-
viding a new definition of verifiability over many i.i.d.
repetitions of the protocol, based on the total variation
distance between the output distribution and the correct
one; (ii) using the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal (RHG)
strategy for fault tolerance instead of using it for prob-
ability amplification; and (iii) developing a simpler con-
struction for verification and computation on separate
planar graphs.
To answer the second challenge above, we show quantum
supremacy in the presence of noise with emulated fault-
tolerance. We go beyond Ref. [29] by (i) solving one of
its open problems – proving quantum supremacy of im-
proved threshold fault-tolerant model up to additive er-
rors (Theorem 3) and (ii) verifying quantum supremacy
while maintaining its improved thresholds.
Our verification schemes apply to any nonadaptive sam-
pler based on cluster states, however we will use the Ising
sampler [20] as a particular example, thus keeping the
benefit of the single instance property and experimen-
tal feasibility of this model. Our work is a significant
improvement over the verification method of Ref. [20] on
two counts. Firstly, our schemes require a linear overhead
in the number of qubits as opposed to a quadratic one in
Ref [20]. Secondly, our schemes (fault-tolerant ones) scale
in the face of constant local noise while that of Ref [20]
requires local noise polynomially small in the total num-
ber of qubits.
Our work is structured as follows. Section II defines veri-
fiability based on the total variation distance of the out-
put distribution. Section III provides an overview of the
Ising sampler placed in an a cryptographic setting of a
prover and a verifier. Section IV contains the first of our
main results on the verification of the Ising sampler’s out-
put. We present a non-fault-tolerant verification scheme
(Theorem 1). Since it requires decreasing noise in prepa-
ration, entanglement and measurement with increasing
system size, this is only viable in small-sized experimen-
tal demonstrations of quantum supremacy. In Section V
we present two fault-tolerant versions of the verification
scheme (Theorem 2) which are scalable when noise is
below certain thresholds. Section VI provides a result
(Theorem 3) on the quantum supremacy of the output
distribution of the noisy Ising sampler conditioned on
syndrome measurements accepting, which is a generali-
sation of Ref. [29] for additive errors.
II. VERIFIABILITY
We begin with our definition of a verification proto-
col.
Definition 1 (Verification protocol). A verification pro-
tocol involves two parties - a trusted verifier and an un-
trusted prover who share a quantum and classical chan-
nel. The protocol takes as input a description of a compu-
tation and outputs a string and a bit. The bit determines
if the string is accepted or rejected.
Establishing verifiability of a protocol consists of proving
completeness and soundness. A protocol is complete if,
for an honest prover, the verifier outputs the correct re-
sult and accepts. A protocol is sound if, for any deviation
of the prover, the probability that the verifier outputs an
incorrect result and accepts is low. This deviation cap-
tures both a malevolent prover who tries to cheat and
uncontrollable errors in the prover’s device.
Note that the above notion of verifiability relies on an
output string being correct while sampling relies on dis-
tributions being close. We are therefore interested in the
total variation distance between the experimental output
distribution and the exact one [31]. We are furthermore
interested in arguing for quantum supremacy based on
the total variation distance between distributions. This
requires us to go from a joint distribution of a string and a
bit to a probability distribution over strings conditioned
on a bit. To meet these demands we introduce the idea of
a verification scheme, that uses a protocol as a black box
and can call it repeatedly. We also assume that the rep-
etitions of the protocols are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.). However, there is no assumption on
the behaviour of the system within the protocol, which
means that an adversarial prover can cheat by correlating
systems within the protocol.
Definition 2 (Verification scheme). A verification
scheme takes as input a verification protocol, M ∈ N, l ∈
[0, 1] and outputs a string and a bit. The bit determines
if the string is accepted or rejected.
A verification scheme works as follows. After running M
i.i.d repetitions of a verification protocol it outputs one
of the M output strings at random and accepts if at least
a fraction l of the protocols accept and rejects otherwise.
Let qnsy(x) be the experimental and qexc(x) be the ex-
act distribution of the output x of a sampler. We are
interested in the quantity
var ≡ 1
2
∑
x
|qexc(x)− qnsy(x)|, (1)
where the sum is over all binary strings x of size
N .
The following definition captures the notions of complete-
ness and soundness at the level of a scheme for sampling
problems.
Definition 3 (Verifiability of a scheme). A scheme is
verifiable if its output is
3• (δ′, δ)−complete: For an honest prover having only
bounded noise, the scheme accepts at least with
probability δ′, and
var ≤ 1− δ (2)
for the output string.
• (ε′, ε)−sound: For any, including adversarial,
prover if the scheme accepts then
var ≤ ε (3)
with confidence ε′.
We then consider the verifiability of a scheme for a
sampler which has a designated output register we
call the post-selection register. We consider probabilities
qnsy(x|y = 0), where y is the value of the post-selection
register, for the experimental and qexc(x|y = 0) for the
exact distribution of a sampler, conditioned on y being
zero. We are interested in the quantity
varPost ≡ 1
2
∑
x
|qexc(x|y = 0)− qnsy(x|y = 0)|. (4)
Again, the sums are over all binary strings x of size N .
We adapt our definition to conditional probabilities as
follows.
Definition 4 (Verifiability of a scheme for post-selected
distribution). A scheme is verifiable conditioned on the
post-selection register being zero, if its output is
• (δ′, δ)−complete: For an honest prover having only
bounded noise, the scheme accepts at least with
probability δ′, and
varPost ≤ 1− δ (5)
for the the output string.
• (ε′, ε)−sound: For any, including adversarial,
prover if the scheme accepts, then
varPost ≤ ε (6)
with confidence ε′.
III. QUANTUM SAMPLING IN THE
VERIFIER-PROVER SETTING
In the verifier-prover setting, the verifier can prepare
bounded-error, single-qubit states and the prover imple-
ments the rest of the computation including the mea-
surements, and returns the output samples to the veri-
fier. The role of the verifier is to ascertain if the prover is
acting honestly and executing the correct operation. The
prover is, in general, malicious, trying to pass any tests
designed by the verifier while deviating from the correct
implementation at the same time. This malice may be in-
tentional if the prover is trying to convince the verifier of
its quantum power when it has none, or incidental if the
prover possesses an imperfect quantum device prone to
noise and errors. We assume that the prover’s deviations
are governed by quantum mechanics.
We begin by adapting the Ising spin model to a
blind verifier-prover cryptographic setting [32]. Blind-
ness, which ensures that the prover remains ignorant
of the actual computation, is a necessary ingredient in
our verification scheme. Our Ising spin model consists
of qubits in state |+〉 subject to nearest neighbour con-
trolled pi-phase rotations, denoted by cZ. All the qubits
are measured simultaneously in a basis in the xy-plane
of the Bloch sphere. The measurement outcome of classi-
cal bits is the output sample. This model corresponds to
the well-studied measurement-based quantum comput-
ing (MBQC) model [33] without the adaptive measure-
ments. This last restriction, which relaxes DiVincenzo’s
criteria of long decoherence times, makes this model non-
universal for quantum computing.
In the particular Ising sampler presented in [20] the struc-
ture of the graph state is fixed (Fig. (1)), but its size
scales with the width m and depth n. The measure-
ment angles are also fixed to specific values from the set
{−pi/4,−pi/8, 0, pi/8, pi/4}. This choice of graph, which
we call the ‘extended’ brickwork state, and a fixed angle
for each physical qubit has the following benefit: Each
possible combination of measurement outcomes ‘chooses’
a different angle for each qubit of the original brickwork
state from the set {kpi/4}, k = {0, . . . , 7}. This effectively
makes a single instance of the model a random quantum
circuit generator, a property exploited to prove its hard-
ness.
The correspondence to an Ising model comes from the lo-
cality of spin interactions and decomposing each MBQC
measurement into a unitary rotation around the z-axis
corresponding to an external magnetic field, followed by
a Pauli X measurement. The quantum state just before
the Pauli X measurement is given by the unitary evolu-
tion due to the Hamiltonian
H = −
∑
〈i,j〉
JZiZj +
∑
i
BiZi (7)
where J is the interaction term, Bi the local field strength
and Zi the Pauli Z operator on qubit i.
The probability qexc(x) of measuring a bit string x cor-
responds to the partition function Zx of the Ising model
with Hamiltonian H′ ≡ H + pi2
∑
i xiZi and is given
by
qexc(x) =
|Tr(e−i(H+pi2
∑
i xiZi))|2
22N
≡ |Zx|
2
22N
, (8)
where N = mn. The second term in H′ comes from the
measurement outcomes of the Pauli X measurements,
and the partition function is evaluated at an imaginary
temperature β = 1/kBT = i. Although the partition
function at imaginary temperatures may appear unphys-
ical, it has deep connections to quantum complexity the-
ory [12] as well as quantum statistical and condensed
matter physics via analytic continuations.
4Testing the honesty of the prover, in our case the Ising
sampler, requires the ‘blind’ injection of certain ‘trap’
qubits. To keep the identity of these trap qubits from the
prover, the verifier applies some encoding on the orig-
inal translationally-invariant Ising spin model, making
the model translationally variant. Now both the partici-
pating qubits and the measurement angles on the graph
state have a randomly chosen extra rotation according to
the scheme described next.
Specifically, each qubit i is individually prepared by the
verifier in the state |+θi〉 , where θi is chosen uniformly
at random from the set A = {0, pi8 , 2pi8 , . . . , 15pi8 }. Instead
of the prover measuring in fixed predetermined angles,
as in the original Ising sampler, the verifier sends en-
crypted angles to the prover: δi = θi + (−1)r′iφi + ripi for
ri, r
′
i ∈R {0, 1}, where ∈R stands for a uniform random
selection. Rotations by θi on the qubit and on the angles
mutually cancel and the classical information that the
prover receives (containing the actual measurement an-
gles φi) is classically one time padded by θi. The bits ri, r
′
i
provide some extra randomness to restrict the informa-
tion the prover gets from the quantum state and can be
corrected by classical post-processing of the sample. Our
difference from Ref. [32] lies in the number of angles used
in the set A, and comes from the fact that we use a dif-
ferent decomposition of the computation. We conjecture
that this can be improved upon (See Sec. VII).
IV. NON-FAULT-TOLERANT VERIFICATION
OF ISING SAMPLER
The output of a quantum sampler must be classical for it
to be comparable to that of a classical sampler, a prereq-
uisite for demonstrating quantum supremacy. This allows
us to simplify trap-based verification strategies for uni-
versal quantum computation [31, 34, 35] to having dis-
jointed computational resource and trap states - an idea
also used in Ref. [35] and in circuit-based verification [36].
This permits an exponentially small error in our estima-
tion of the fidelity of the output using a square lattice.
Finally, a trap-based technique instead of fidelity-witness
based certification ones [20, 37], similar also to [38, 39],
enables us to reduce the resource complexity of the veri-
fication protocol from quadratic to linear.
Our verification protocol relies on judiciously selecting
the measurement angles and placing dummy qubits pre-
pared in the state |0〉, which, together with xy-plane mea-
surements, allows us to carve different types of graphs
from a square lattice graph, as shown in Fig. (3). Plac-
ing one dummy qubit between any two other qubits pre-
vents the prover’s entangling operators to have any en-
tangling effect between the participating qubits, so the
prover can apply exactly the same operations that pro-
duce the square lattice but create a different graph state.
The graphs carved out are the ‘extended’ brickwork state
(Fig. 1) and two other graphs containing special ‘trap’
qubits in the state |+〉 . The extended brickwork state
(i)
=
=
pi/8 0 −pi/4 0 pi/4 0 −pi/8
(ii)
FIG. 1: The original brickwork state (i) is a universal
resource for MBQC under xy-plane measurements,
where white vertices represent qubits and the edges
represent cZ operations. The ‘extended’ brickwork state
(ii) is used in the original Ising sampler [20], where each
white vertex is replaced by 7 physical qubits (black
vertices). The measurement angle for each qubit is fixed
to the value written above each vertex. There is no
adaptation of the angles based on previous
measurement outcomes as in universal MBQC.
is used to run the Ising sampler. The traps in the trap
graphs are measured in the same basis as prepared, yield-
ing a deterministic check on the prover. Two different
types of the trap graphs are needed to enable placing a
trap at any position in the graph with equal probabil-
ity. The order of the graphs is chosen at random and
the whole protocol implemented blindly to thwart the
prover from distinguishing trap and target computation
qubits.
A sketch of our Protocol 1 appears in Fig. (2), and
the details in Sec. IV A. The protocol has constant time
complexity of the quantum operations and needs O(N)
qubits, where N is the number of the qubits of the Ising
sampler.
Noise considered in all our protocols for an honest prover
is local, unital and bounded. It applies after every el-
ementary operation (preparation, entangling and mea-
surement) j and is expressed as a CPTP superopera-
tor:
Nj = (1− )I + Ej (9)
where ||Ej || = V for the noise of the verifier (prepara-
tion noise) and ||Ej || = P for the noise of the honest
prover (entangling and measurement noise).
Theorem 1 (Non-fault tolerance verification scheme).
There exists a verification scheme with Protocol 1, M =
log(1/β)/(2κ2N2(V + P )
2), l = (1 − κN(2V + 4P ))
that according to Def. (3) is(
1− β, 1−
√
N(V + 3P )
)
− complete
51. Verifier selects a random ordering of
2κ + 1 graphs, one for target computa-
tion and κ from each type of trap graphs.
2. Verifier prepares, one by one, the qubits needed
for the blind implementation of the 2κ + 1
cluster states and sends them to the prover.
3. Verifier sends the encrypted mea-
surement angles to the prover.
4. Prover entangles all received
qubits in the 2κ + 1 cluster states.
5. Prover measures all qubits simultaneously in
the instructed angles and returns the results.
6. Verifier decrypts the outputs and accepts if
all trap results are correct, otherwise rejects.
FIG. 2: Nonadaptive verification protocol
and (
1− β,
√
κN(3V + 5P ) + ∆κ
)
− sound,
where ∆κ = κ!(κ+ 1)!/(2κ+ 1)!.
In the above, V and P are fixed by the experimental
capability, while completeness and soundness parameters
are set by the conjectures invoked to argue for quantum
supremacy, as obtained in Eqn. (16).
A proof sketch appears in Section IV C and a full proof
in Appendix B.
Using our verifiable quantum sampler to demonstrate
quantum supremacy is underwritten by results which
show that approximating the Ising sampler upto constant
total variation distance is hard classically, subject to an
average case hardness and an anti-concentration conjec-
ture, presented in Section VI, similarly to the original
model [20]. NV and NP must be constant for the to-
tal variation distances to be constant in Theorem 1, re-
quiring the local errors V and P decrease linearly with
the number of qubits. This is only realistic in quantum
supremacy experiments involving a few qubits.
To overcome this restriction, we consider fault-tolerant
versions of our verification protocol in Section V.
A. Protocol
The following is a full description of the non-fault tolerant
verification protocol:
Protocol 1:
1. Verifier selects a random ordering of 2κ + 1 graphs,
one for computation and 2κ for testing, as in Fig. (3).
This fixes the position of computational basis qubits
called the dummy qubits (see Appendix A) and the
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
FIG. 3: Verifier chooses a random ordering of 2κ+ 1
graph states - the computational graph on the right of
figure (i); κ identical trap graphs on the right of figure
(ii) which have traps (starred nodes) on the even parity
positions of the sub-graph that corresponds to the
computational graph; and κ identical graphs on the
right of figure (iii) which have traps on the odd parity
positions of the sub-graph that corresponds to the
computational graph. All of these graphs can be
generated from a square lattice (on the left) by
replacing |+〉 qubits with |0〉 at the positions (isolated
dot nodes) we do not want entangled with their
neighbours when cZ is applied. Further detail on the
carving procedure, which can be made blind (Section
III), is provided in Appendix A.
measurement angles {φi}Ni=1, where N = m× n is the
total number of qubits, so that
(a) in the target computation graph we carve from
the square lattice a universal resource state, the ‘ex-
tended’ brickwork state of Figure (1) and fix the rest of
the measurement angles according to the Ising sampler
model;
(b) in the trap computation graphs the dummy qubits
are used to isolate the traps, which are placed at fixed
positions. For half of the graphs in positions with odd
parity that correspond to non-dummy qubits in the
computational graph and in the other half in positions
with even parity that correspond to non-dummies in
the computational graph. The traps are measured with
angles φ = 0 so that the measurement is deterministic.
Crucially, the trap graphs do not contain any ‘bridge’
operations so there is no need for adaptive corrections.
2. Verifier prepares the qubits that compose the cluster
state one by one and sends them to the prover.
6(a) The dummy qubits are prepared in {|di〉 : di ∈R
{0, 1}}.
(b) The rest of the qubits are prepared in
Zdk∼j |+θj 〉 = 1√2 (|0〉 + ei(θj+dk∼jpi) |1〉), where θj
is chosen uniformly at random from the set A =
{0, pi8 , 2pi8 , . . . , 15pi8 }} and dk∼j is the parity of the d’s of
all neighbours of j. Notice that the set A is different
from the original trap-based protocol of Ref. [31].
3. Verifier sends the encrypted computational measure-
ment angles to the prover: δi = θi + (−1)r′iφi + ripi
for ri, r
′
i ∈R {0, 1}. Parameters ri, r′i create a classical
one-time pad on measurement outputs.
4. Prover entangles all received qubits according to the
2κ + 1 cluster states, each of dimension n × m, by
applying cZ gates for every edge of each cluster.
5. Prover measures all qubits simultaneously in angles δi
and returns the measurement results to the verifier.
6. Verifier applies a bit flip to the output bit i when ri = 1
and to its (non-dummy) neighbours when r′i = 1 to
undo the classical one time pad. The output string
of the measurements of the target computation is the
output of the protocol. The verifier sets an extra bit to
accept if all the traps give the correct result (decoded
measurement result 0).
A variation of the protocol can have the prover to en-
tangle all the graphs directly in the ‘extended brickwork
state’ instead of the square lattice state. This leaks no
extra more information to the prover from what is pub-
licly known. However, we seek a more generic prover and
keep the protocol as presented.
The resource count of the protocol is as follows. The num-
ber of qubits prepared by the verifier and sent to the
prover one at a time is (2κ + 1)N where N is the orig-
inal size of the computation. The classical information
exchanged is linear in N and can be sent in one round.
Similarly the classical outcomes of the measurements can
be sent in one go. The prover is required to entangle all
neighbouring qubits in a square lattice and apply single
qubit measurements in the xy-plane.
B. Proof of Completeness
To prove completeness we assume that the prover hon-
estly follows the prescribed steps (up to bounded noise).
Before considering the noisy case, we show that for the
noiseless prover, the fidelity of the target computation
and the trap computation to the correct ones are both
unity.
We begin with a circuit diagram of the operations on
the prover’s side in Fig. (4). Any measurement by angle
{δi} for the prover is mathematically decomposed into a
z-rotation (Rz) controlled by δi and a Pauli X measure-
ment. Without loss of generality, since everything before
the measurements is unitary we can assume that even a
dishonest prover will apply the correct unitary operators
and then chose his deviation UB on all systems, including
UB
|+θ1〉
|di−1〉
Zdi+1Zdi−1 |+θi〉
|di+1〉
|+θ(2κ+1)N 〉
|δ1〉
|δ(2κ+1)N 〉
|0〉⊗|B|
/
/
/
Rz
Rz
Rz
Rz
Rz
X
X
X
X
X
FIG. 4: The inputs, other than prover’s private system
|0〉⊗|B| , are the qubits prepared by the verifier in steps
1-3 of Protocol 1, for both target and trap rounds. We
represent the prover’s operation (steps 4-6 in Protocol
1) upon their receipt. Qubit at position i is a trap qubit
surrounded by dummy qubits at positions i− 1 and
i+ 1. UB is an arbitrary unitary deviation on the
prover’s system. When prover is honest UB = I.
his private qubits |0〉⊗|B|. Since we are proving complete-
ness in this section, we assume UB = I. The measurement
angles δi received by the prover are represented as com-
putational basis multi-qubit states |δi〉.
The circuit in Fig. (4) can be simplified in a number of
ways, resulting in the circuit of Fig. (5). The cZ gates
between the dummy qubits and their neighbours cancel
the Pauli Z pre-rotation on the neighbours. Also, we can
write explicitly the rotation angles on each of the con-
trolled Rz gates and remove the control lines.
Further simplification follows when the z-rotations by
θi which are part of the Rz gates and the z-rotations
by θi applied by the verifier to the qubits before send-
ing them to the prover mutually cancel after commuting
with the cZ gates. Notice that the dummy qubits are
an exception since θi rotations remain but have no ef-
fect other than a global phase. Moreover, we can extract
the Pauli operators from the Rz by applying identities:
Rz(−χ) = XRz(χ)X and Rz(χ + pi) = ZRz(χ). The
Pauli X operators from the left hand side of Rz can be
rewritten as Z rotations on their entangled neighbours.
7UB
|+θ1〉
|di−1〉
|+θi〉
|di+1〉
|+θN′ 〉
|δ1〉
|δN′〉
|0〉⊗|B|
/
/
/
Rz(θ1 + (−1)r′1φ1 + r1pi)
Rz(θi−1 + ri−1pi)
Rz(θi + ripi)
Rz(θi+1 + ri+1pi)
Rz(θN′ + (−1)r′N′φN′ + rN′pi)
X
X
X
X
X
FIG. 5: When applying the corresponding entangling
operations in Fig. 4, dummy qubits at positions i− 1
and i+ 1 have the effect of isolating their neighbours
and cancelling the neighbours’ pre-rotations that
depend on parameters di−1, di+1 (here the only
neighbour depicted is the trap qubit at position i).
Also, unitary rotations of Fig. 4 are written explicitly.
Remember that for dummy and trap qubits angles φ
take value 0. For clarity of the figure we have used
N ′ ≡ (2κ+ 1)N .
This results in the circuit diagram depicted in Fig. (6).
Notice that the remaining Pauli X operators do not have
any effect on the Pauli X measurements (we recall that
in this proof UB = I) and the Pauli Z operators flip the
measurement results.
Let us denote all the measurement outcomes of the pro-
tocol except the dummy qubit measurements by the bi-
nary vector x and p(x) the probability of obtaining it.
Let qexc(x) denote the exact probability of obtaining x in
an non-encrypted MBQC implementation using the same
measurement pattern {φ}Ni as input. The only difference
between the actual and the non-encrypted case are the
Pauli Z operators before the measurements, which flip
the outcomes. Therefore, by relabelling the probabilities
p(x) to p(x′), where x′i = xi ⊕ ri ⊕
∑
j r
′
j∼i, we get
qexc(x) = p(x′). In other words, in the noiseless case,
we can sample from the exact distribution by simply cor-
recting the bit flips caused by the random Pauli Z, which
are known to the verifier.
UB
|+〉
|0〉
|+〉
|0〉
|+〉
|δ1〉
|δN′〉
|0〉⊗|B|
/
/
/
Rz(φ1)
Xdi−1
Xdi+1
Rz(φN′)
Xr
′
1
Rz(θi−1)
Xr
′
i
Rz(θi+1)
Xr
′
N′
Zr1+
∑
j∼1 r
′
j
Zri−1
Zri
Zri+1
ZrN′+
∑
j∼N′ r
′
j
X
X
X
X
X
FIG. 6: Each z-rotation by θ in Fig. 5 undoes the
corresponding pre-rotations of the qubits (except for the
dummies that have no pre-rotation by θ). For any qubit
k, operations in the form Rz((−1)r′kφk) in Fig. 5 can be
written as Xr
′
kRz(φk)X
r′k and the Xr
′
k before (in
temporal order) when commuting with the
entanglement operators can be written as Zr
′
k on the
neighbours (this has an effect on qubits 1 and N ′ in this
figure). All Pauli operators here are written separately
from z−rotations. Notice that we can write an extra
Xr
′
i , with r′i ∈R {0, 1}, applying on the trap qubit i
since X |+〉 = |+〉.
In MBQC, we can also write the distribution in terms
of unitaries, labelled by the measurement outcomes (the
so-called branches of the MBQC computation) of all the
layers except the last. For dimension m×n, we have (up
to global phases)
qexc(x) =
| 〈x(n−1)m+1, . . . , xnm|Ux1,...,x(n−1)m |+1, . . . ,+m〉 |2
2(n−1)m
(10)
since all the computational branches (x1, . . . , x(n−1)m)
are equiprobable and they define a unitary operation on
the input [40]. For the trap qubits this distribution is de-
terministic since each qubit is prepared in the |+〉 state,
remains isolated throughout the computation and is mea-
8sured in the |±〉 basis.
Now, consider local bounded noise of the form of Eqn. (9)
after every elementary operation j, including prepara-
tion, entangling and measurement. The operations that
can introduce noise in a single round of the protocol in-
clude N preparations at the verifier’s end and at most
2N entanglements and N measurements at the prover’s
end. This is an upper bound of 4N operations. The fi-
delity F 2c of the noisy output of the target computation
to the noiseless one (which is the correct one as we proved
above) cannot be smaller than 1− (NV + 3NP ). Since
for any two states ρ, σ, D(ρ, σ) ≤ √1− F 2(ρ, σ), this is
an upper bound in total variation distance for the target
computation 1− δ = √N(V + 3P ).
Completeness means that our scheme should accept with
high probability in the case of bounded noise. The ac-
ceptance of the scheme, according to Def. (2), depends
on our estimate F̂ 2t of the acceptance probability of the
protocol F 2t . Given the above bounded noise, F
2
t cannot
be smaller than 1− κN(V + 3P ).
Our estimate for F 2t comes from M i.i.d. repetitions of
the protocol. By Hoeffding’s inequality, repeating M =
log(1/β)/(2κ2N2(V + P )
2) times gets us κN(V + P )-
close in our estimation with confidence 1 − β. In order
to have high probability of acceptance we need to set the
limit for accepting the estimate to (1−κ(2NV +4NP )).
Then our probability of accepting is as high as our con-
fidence. Setting this limit is necessary to get high com-
pleteness but will have an effect in the soundness.
C. Proof of Soundness
The proof of soundness of Theorem 1 is based on the fact
that the fraction of accepting protocols, F̂ 2t , is a good
estimator of a lower bound in the fidelity F 2c of the tar-
get computation. Thus, looking at F̂ 2t gives us with high
confidence a lower bound on the fidelity, or similarly an
upper bound on total variation distance var, as defined
in Eq. (1).
We outline the main arguments employed to prove this
theorem in stages here, and provide the explicit algebraic
derivations in Appendix (B).
Firstly, a unitary deviation UB applied before the mea-
surements, depicted in Fig. (6), captures in all generality
the prover’s dishonesty. To see this, consider the case
when the prover performs measurements different from
the honest ones. This corresponds to applying a unitary
basis rotation followed by Pauli X measurements. Then,
UB applies also on the prover’s private subsystem so he
can use this power to replace the qubits he receives with
any other qubits he chooses to prepare privately. In any
case, he has to report some classical measurement results
so we always keep the final Pauli X measurements in the
picture. Our proof should therefore apply to any choice
of UB .
Secondly, we bound the total variation distance of the
output distribution via the trace distance D(ρc, ρ
′
c),
where ρc represents the state of the computational sys-
tem just after the Pauli X measurements if the prover is
honest and ρ′c the same state if the prover is dishonest.
Thus,
var ≤ D(ρc, ρ′c) ≤
√
1− F 2(ρc, ρ′c)
=
√
1− Tr2(
√
ρcρ′c) (11)
The main idea leading to the statement of the theorem is
that the acceptance probability F 2t minus a lower bound
on the fidelity of the computational system F 2(ρc, ρ
′
c)
is small, when averaged over the random parameters.
Therefore, by estimating F 2t (by counting the fraction
of acceptances over many repetitions of the protocol), we
get a good estimate of a lower bound on the fidelity of
the computational system and therefore an upper bound
on var. We begin our analysis for the case of perfect
preparations and subsequently incorporate the effect of
noise.
Averaged over the random parameters, the probability of
getting all trap outcomes 1, summing over the random
variables ri, r
′
i, di and θi, is calculated in Appendix B
as
F 2t =
∑
t
p(t)
∑
k
|αk|2
∏
i∈t
| 〈+|i Pk|i |+〉i |2, (12)
where t is the vector of the indices of the positions of the
traps in all 2κ trap systems and
∑
t takes all possible
values allowed by the construction with equal probability
p(t). The summation over the random parameters results
in the attack on the trap system to be transformed into
a convex combination of Pauli operators Pk, each with
probability |αk|2. By Pk|i we represent the Pauli operator
that applies on qubit i.
The average fidelity Fc of the computational system
is
Fc ≡
∑
r,θ,t
p(r,θ, t)F (ρc, ρ
′
c) =
∑
r,θ,t
p(r,θ, t)Tr(
√
ρcρ′c),
where ρc and ρ
′
c represent the honest and dishonest state
of the target computation just after the Pauli X measure-
ments. Calculation, presented in detail in Appendix B,
leads to
F 2c ≥
∑
t
p(t)
∑
k
|αk|2
∏
i∈c(t)
| 〈+|i Pk|i |+〉i |2 (13)
where c(t) denotes the positions of the qubits that par-
ticipate in the computation and depends on the random
ordering of the 2κ+ 1 rounds and therefore is a function
of the position of the traps.
In general we prove that
F 2t − F 2c ≤
κ!(κ+ 1)!
(2κ+ 1)!
≡ ∆κ. (14)
9The verification scheme output bit is set to accept or
reject by averaging over M repetitions of the protocol
and comparing our estimate of F 2t with (1 − κN(2V +
4P )) (set by completeness). By Hoeffiding’s inequality
repeating M = log(1/β)/(2κ2N2(V + P )
2) times gets
us κN(V + P )-close in our estimation with confidence
1− β. Therefore, F 2t − F 2c ≤ κN(3V + 5P ) + ∆κ. This
means that for the total variation distance we have an
upper bound, which gives the soundness parameter ε of
Def. (3)
var ≤ ε =
√
κN(3V + 5P ) + ∆κ.
V. FAULT-TOLERANT VERIFICATION OF
ISING SAMPLER
Ensuring NV and NP in Theorem 1 to be constant will
get harder experimentally for increasing N . Therefore, we
present two new fault-tolerant verification schemes where
the total noise scales linearly with the size, and prove that
it provides a distribution that is hard to sample from
classically upto constant additive error. We then prove
that noise scaling with system size does not prevent us
from verifying the provers distribution with completeness
and soundness parameters independent of the problem
size.
Quantum fault tolerance strategies such as due to
RHG [41] can overcome the challenge of noise scaling
with system size. This involves gate distillation requir-
ing adaptive operations which are beyond the Ising sam-
pler. On the target computation, our fault tolerant ver-
ification schemes overcome this adaptivity by using ar-
guments for free postselection due to Fujii [29] as ap-
plied to the verification of quantum supremacy. On the
trap computation, we do not require any adaptivity since
we chose it to be Clifford. This keeps our fault toler-
ant verification schemes within the Ising sampler, al-
lowing verification of quantum supremacy in the pres-
ence of total noise scaling linearly with the size. Note
that a non-Clifford trap computation would suffer due
to nonadaptivity. Time complexity of the quantum op-
erations in the protocol is constant and the number of
qubits needed is O(NPolyLog(N)) [41], the polylogarith-
mic overhead coming from the properties of the topolog-
ical code and the use of concatenation in the distillation
procedure.
The next issue of fault-tolerant thresholds leads to two
fault-tolerant versions of the protocol in Fig. (2) and
described in detail in Sections V A and V B. The first
is called Protocol 2a. It employs the full RHG encod-
ing in the traps leading to the threshold of thres =
0.75% [41], the same threshold as for universal quan-
tum computation. This is worse than the suggested im-
provements in the noise thresholds for unverified quan-
tum supremacy [29]. However, our next protocol, Pro-
tocol 2b, provides thres = 1.97% for verified quantum
supremacy, which is an underestimate since we ignore
correlated errors.
To achieve this threshold, Protocol 2b, replaces error cor-
rection with error detection when performing the RHG
encoding on the trap qubits. This is possible because the
trap qubits are isolated and can be retransmitted individ-
ually without affecting the rest of the trap computation.
The numerical value is obtained by performing a thresh-
old calculation of applying the RHG encoding in MBQC
(Appendix C). A similar procedure was performed in the
circuit model by Fujii [29]. The cost of maintaining the
same completeness and soundness as in Protocols 1 and
2a is to replace κ in Fig. (2) by Mκ, where M is an ex-
tra overhead in the number of qubits depending on the
code minimal distance d between and around the defects
and the noise parameter . For example, with d = 2 and
 as the following fractions of the noise threshold, we
have
 thres/20 thres/50 thres/100
M 3× 108 2863 54
Improvement in M may also be possible with judicious
braiding or using an alternative topological code.
An additional intricacy needs resolving for both fault-
tolerant protocols. Since blindness is an ingredient in our
verification scheme, its straightforward application (on
the logical level) risks leaking the logical measurement
angles in the distillation procedure, where many copies
of the same magic state need to be sent. Also, for the
distillation procedure to be effective, we need to reveal
information about the state distilled. Our stratagem for
circumventing this is to apply blindness on the lowest
level of MBQC, on which the fault-tolerant construction
is based. The traps are applied at the logical MBQC level,
since those are the qubits needing protection from noise,
as outlined in Fig. (7).
Ising Sampler and Trap Computations MBQC
(Logical layer)
Protected topology using defects
Blind 3D cluster-state MBQC
(Physical layer)
FIG. 7: Layered structure of verifiable FT computation.
Our proof of the classical hardness of Ising sampling in
this case (Theorem 3) relies on proving the complete-
ness and soundness of verifying conditional probabilities
(Theorem 2). They are proved in Section V A.
Noise is again of the form of Eqn. (9). Suppose the ver-
ifier’s noise in each qubit preparation is local, bounded
by V < thres, the threshold and does not depend on the
secret parameters. Assume the honest prover’s noise in
each elementary operation is bounded by P < thres. In
order to prove Theorem 2 we make the extra assumption
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that verifier’s noise is independent of the secret parame-
ters.
In the following theorem, ′′ is the error rate of the code
and scales down exponentially with distance parameter d.
Let qnsy(x|y = 0) be the experimental and qexc(x|y = 0)
the exact distribution of the Ising sampler, when they
are conditioned on the syndrome measurement outcome
y giving the null result. The theorem holds for both Pro-
tocol 2a and 2b.
Theorem 2 (Fault-tolerant verification scheme). There
exists a verification scheme with Protocol 2a/2b, M =
log(1/β)/(2′′2) and l = (1 − 2′′), that according to
Def. (4) is
(1− β, 1−
√
′′)− complete
and
(1− β,
√
3′′ + ∆κ)− sound
where ∆κ = κ!(κ+ 1)!/(2κ+ 1)!.
A. Protocol 2a
The fault-tolerant computation scheme used is the
one proposed by RHG [41]. Single qubit prepara-
tion/distillation, entangling gates (cX) and Pauli X mea-
surements are topologically protected using the three di-
mensional lattice shown in Fig. (8) and measurement-
based implementation of the topological operations
(more details on the MBQC implementation of the RHG
code see [42], [44]). Universality comes from topologically
protected concatenated distillation (Fig. (9)) of magic
states:
|Y 〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i |1〉), |A〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ eipi4 |1〉)
FIG. 8: 3D cluster state used in the RHG code using
MBQC. Blue dots are the qubits that represent the
primal cubic lattice edges (or equivalently the dual
cubic lattice faces) and red dots are the qubits that
represent the primal cubic lattice faces (or equivalently
the dual cubic lattice edges). Entangling operations
(cZ) are represented by blue lines. On the right hand
side you can see the primal and dual cubes, as are
adapted from Refs. [41, 42].
|+〉 • T X
|+〉 • T X
|0〉 T X
|+〉 • T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|+〉 • T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|+〉 • • T X
|0〉
FIG. 9: Distillation step [43]. A logical |+〉 is produced
using the (15, 1, 3) quantum Reed-Muller code. Then a
transversal T gate applied using the technique of Figure
(10), stabilizer measurements and teleportation to an
auxiliary qubit gives a ‘cleaner’ magic state (up to Pauli
Z correction on the teleported qubit) when the error
syndromes are correct. Everything is topologically
protected. Picture adapted from Ref. [13].
which are generated by single physical qubit measure-
ments. Using the logical distilled magic states and the
gate teleportation model one can implement a universal
set of gates (Fig. 10). One can simulate an MBQC com-
putation by using these gates and Pauli measurements
and consequently add a forth dimension to the system,
which comes from the flow of the logical MBQC oper-
ations (notice that this layer is distinct from the physi-
cal MBQC layer on which the topological code is imple-
mented). The exact usage of RHG encoding in our FT
verification scheme depends on whether we use error cor-
rection or error detection in our trap computation, giving
two separate protocols.
Our first fault-tolerant protocol follows the protocol for
the non-fault-tolerant verification of quantum supremacy,
introduced in Sec. IV but using fault tolerance.
Protocol 2a:
1. Trapification: Verifier selects a random ordering of
2κ+ 1 sufficiently large 3D graphs of Fig. (8), one for
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the target computation and 2κ for the trap compu-
tations. In the target computation round the logical
computation is the same as the one in the non-fault-
tolerant protocol (see Fig. 1). In the trap computation
rounds, the logical graph contains isolated traps in the
same configuration as in the non-fault-tolerant version
(see Fig. 3). We call this the logical layer of our pro-
tocol.
2. Generation of the ‘topological code-compatible’
circuit: The above MBQC patterns contain |±φ〉mea-
surements that are not compatible with the topo-
logical code. We directly translate the MBQC pat-
terns into a circuit with the same operations, with
the difference that the measurements are replaced
by teleportation of distilled |+φ〉 states followed by
Pauli X measurements. Since our rotations are mul-
tiples of pi/8, |A〉 magic states need be replaced by
1√
2
(|0〉 + eipi8 |1〉) states, gate teleportation is as de-
scribed before (Fig. 10) with a T gate instead of a S
gate correction and distillation based on (31, 1, 3) in-
stead of (15, 1, 3) quantum Reed-Muller code. Adap-
tive T gates are not applied since we want to keep the
model instantaneous - this will be accounted for in our
supremacy proof. To avoid adaptivity in distillation we
fix which magic states we keep for the next level of dis-
tillation independently of the syndrome measurements
outcomes - this is not a problem because we have ‘free’
postselection on the syndrome measurements of the
computation run.
Even the |±〉 measurements of the traps use inputs
that go through the distillation and teleportation pro-
cedure (Fig. 10 (iii)). This is in order for the physical
attacks to have the same effect on the target and trap
computation at the logical level (see proof of verifia-
bility for more).
3. Topological translation: The topological transla-
tion from the circuit to the topology is straightfor-
ward [42].
4. Blind implementation of topology: The topologi-
cal code is implemented at the physical level by MBQC
using the 3D-graphs, so that we can implement them
blindly using the following encryption.
(a) Verifier prepares, one by one, the pre-rotated
physical qubits |+θ〉, θ ∈R {0, pi4 , 2pi4 , . . . , 7pi4 },
needed for the blind implementation of the topo-
logical protected computation on the three di-
mensional cluster states and sends them to the
prover. Blindness, induced by the random rota-
tions, hides from the prover the physical opera-
tions applied and therefore the logical structure
of the computation in the topologically protected
(vacuum) and isolated qubit region. In particu-
lar, the prover is not able to distinguish between
implementing distillation and teleportation of a
magic state or a |+〉 state used for computation
and testing respectively.
(b) Verifier sends all the encrypted measurement an-
gles δi = θi + (−1)r′iφi + ripi for ri, r′i ∈R {0, 1}.
|ψ〉 Z
|Y 〉 • X Z S |ψ〉
(i)
|ψ〉 Z
|A〉 • X S T |ψ〉
(ii)
|ψ〉 Z
|+〉 • X I |ψ〉
(iii)
FIG. 10: (i), (ii) Gate teleportation (up to global phase)
using magic states |Y 〉 , |A〉, (iii) State teleportation
using auxiliary state |+〉 that mimics gate teleportation
(via blindess). These operations are applied in a
topologically protected way, both during state
distillation using ‘impure’ states and to implement the
corresponding logical operations during computation
using distilled states.
Parameters ri, r
′
i are classical one-time pads for
the measurement outputs.
(c) Prover runs the computation, by entangling, mea-
suring all at once and returning the results.
(d) Verifier classically corrects the returned outcomes
using the correction procedure of the quantum
error correcting code used in distillation and the
topological code and undoes the r, r′ pad.
(e) Verifier accepts if all the results of the logical trap
computations are correct, otherwise rejects.
Completeness of the protocol follows the same analysis
as in the non-fault-tolerant case. We can eliminate the
pre-rotations by the θ’s of the computation in the lower
level MBQC due to θ being in δ and, then, the com-
putation is correct up to Pauli Z corrections before the
measurements. Local noise is taken care of by the error
correction if it is lower than the threshold of the RHG
code. This avoids scaling issues that we had in the non
fault-tolerant protocol. In particular because of fault tol-
erance we get var ≤ √′′. Completeness means that our
scheme should also accept with high probability and this
is achieved by setting the limit to accept the fidelity es-
timate to (1 − 2′′). By repeating N = log(1/β)/(2′′2)
times gets us
√
′′-close in our estimation with confidence
1− β. Thus, this is a lower bound on the probability our
scheme accepts in the case of completeness.
The proof of soundness is similar to the non fault-tolerant
case since the noise can be considered part of the prover’s
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|+〉 • X
|+〉 • • • X
|+〉 • X
|+〉 • X
|+〉 • • • X
|+〉 • X
(a)
|+〉 • X
|0〉 Z
|+〉 • X
|0〉 Z
|+〉 • • • X
|0〉 Z
(b)
(c)
(d)
FIG. 11: (a) ‘H’-shaped building component of
brickwork state. (b) Same with cNOT gates where the
control is always |+〉 and the target always |0〉. (c)
Translation into prime (blue)/dual (red) topologically
protected qubits. (d) Prime/dual colouring of the
topologically protected brickwork state.
attack that has the same effect on the target computa-
tion and the trap at a logical level. We show this in Ap-
pendix D.
The threshold of this protocol is the same as the threshold
of the RHG code since error correction is used in the trap
rounds.
B. Protocol 2b
We now adapt Protocol 2a to work with error detection
and attain a better threshold. The main idea is that be-
cause the traps are isolated qubits one can look at the
syndrome measurements of all trap computations and
pick from each computation only the logical trap qubit
measurements that are correct individually.
The traps in this case test topologically protected qubits
of the graph state that implements the target compu-
tation together with the distillation. This is because we
want to have smaller traps, in terms of number of phys-
ical qubits, compared to Protocol 2a where a trap can
be as large as a magic state distillation circuit. This is
crucial because by employing error detection and retrans-
mission, one needs to resend one logical trap every time
at least one syndrome measurement in the topologically
protected region around the trap fails (we limit this over-
head to M times).
To avoid the trap computation being distinguishable
from the target, we implement the traps as if all qubits
have an injected singular qubit, but the injected singular
qubit is prepared in the |+〉 state and therefore the logi-
cal input remains the logical |+〉. The underlying MBQC
blindness hides the qubit that is injected. Each trap com-
putation is now performed M times.
Protocol 2b:
1. Generation of the ‘topological code-compatible’
MBQC pattern: Verifier selects a random ordering
of 2κM + 1 sufficiently large 3D graphs of Fig. (8),
one for the target computation and 2κM for the trap
computations. For the target computation round: The
Ising sampler MBQC pattern of Fig. (1) is translated
into a ‘topological code-compatible’ one, i.e. an MBQC
pattern where qubits are prepared as |+kpi/8〉 states
and always measured in the {|±〉} basis. This transla-
tion is possible using again circuits similar to Fig. (10).
Notice that this introduces some adaptive T gates that
we cannot perform if we want to keep the model instan-
taneous - this will be accounted for in our supremacy
proof. Moreover, topological protection requires the
distillation of the magic states and this can also be
translated into an MBQC pattern. To avoid adaptiv-
ity we fix which magic states we keep for the next level
of distillation independently of the syndrome measure-
ments outcomes - this is not a problem because we
have ‘free’ postselection on the computation run. The
final MBQC pattern can be also standardised to the
form of a brickwork state so that it can be trapified
shown as in Fig. (3).
2. Trapification: The target computation is the MBQC
pattern generated in the previous step. For the trap
round, as shown in Fig. (3), we have two types of
trap computations by isolating qubits of the brick-
work state. This is also ‘topological code-compatible’.
Qubits are prepared in the |+〉 or |0〉 state and are
measured in the {|±〉} basis. Notice that in the trap
rounds there is no adaptivity. We call this the logical
layer of our protocol.
3. Topological translation: As shown in Fig. (11) one
can translate the ‘topological code-compatible’ MBQC
pattern into a topology that conforms with the topo-
logical code. To avoid leaking any information con-
cerning when magic states or dummy qubits are in-
jected, we inject a physical qubit at every logical qubit.
Thus, we use the same topology to inject |+〉 (which
is equivalent to not injecting anything in the topology
of Fig. (11)) or |0〉 or a magic state when needed.
4. Blind implementation of topology: In order to im-
plement the above topology blindly, so that the prover
does not know which physical states we inject, we
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chose to implement it on MBQC and use the following
encryption.
(a) Verifier prepares, one by one, the pre-rotated
physical qubits |+θ〉, θ ∈R {0, pi4 , 2pi4 , . . . , 7pi4 }
(b) Verifier sends all the encrypted measurement an-
gles δi = θi + (−1)r′iφi + ripi for ri, r′i ∈R {0, 1}.
Parameters ri, r
′
i are classical one-time pads for
the measurement outputs.
(c) Prover runs the computation, by entangling, mea-
suring all at once and returning the results. All
other topological corrections are implemented by
the verifier keeping track of the Pauli corrections.
(d) Verifier classically detects the errors in the re-
turned syndrome measurements after undoing
the r, r′ pad of the trap computations. From the
set of the κM logical trap qubits corresponding to
each position in the trap graph it selects κ correct
ones. This is possible, on average, if M is large
enough as described at the end of Appendix C.
This results in the quantity ∆κ in Theorem 2 be-
ing averaged over the noise distribution.
(e) Verifier accepts the outcome of the target com-
putation if all the results of the logical trap com-
putations are correct, otherwise rejects.
The proof of correctness and soundness are identical to
Protocol 2a.
VI. NOISY COMPUTATIONAL SUPREMACY
Assuming the following conjectures, the quantum com-
putational supremacy theorem (Theorem 3) for the noisy
case holds.
Conjecture 1 (Average-case hardness). For 0 ≤
α1, β1 ≤ 1, approximating the probability distribution of
the Ising sampler by papx(x|y = 0) up to multiplicative
error
|papx(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)| ≤ α1qexc(x|y = 0)
in time poly(|x|, 1/α1, 1/β1) is #P -hard for at least a
fraction β1 of x instances.
Conjecture 2 (Anti-concentration). There exist some
0 ≤ α2, β2 ≤ 1, 1/α2 ∈ poly(1/β2) such that for all x
prob
(
qexc(x|y = 0) ≥ α2
2N
)
≥ β2 (15)
The above encapsulate two properties for the Ising sam-
pler: the worst to average case hardness equivalence for
multiplicative approximations and the probability anti-
concentration conjecture.
Theorem 3 (Fault-tolerant hardness). Assume that
Conjectures 1 and 2 hold. Then sampling from the output
distribution of the experimental Ising sampler qnsy(x, y)
with a classical machine, assuming a (ε′, ε)-sound verifi-
cation scheme (Def. 3/Def. 4) accepts with
ε ≤ (β1 + β2 − 1− 2
−N )α1α2
2
, (16)
implies, with confidence ε′, a collapse in the polynomial
hierarchy to the third level.
In order to have a scheme with positive soundness param-
eter ε, we need our conjectures to satisfy β1+β2−2−N ≥
1.
The proof uses Stockmeyer’s theorem [45], which is based
on a hypothetical machine and predicts, if classical sam-
pling is possible, the collapse of the polynomial hierarchy
to the third level. The collapse of the infinite polynomial
hierarchy at any level is considered a highly unlikely event
in computational complexity theory.
A. Proof
Compared the the FT hardness proof of [29], our proof is
for the more general case of additive as opposed to multi-
plicative approximation, thus answering an open question
of that paper.
We follow a similar line of reasoning as the original trans-
lationally invariant Ising sampler [20] - proof by contra-
diction. The main difference is that we use probabilities
conditioned on null syndromes. Other differences include
adding explanation of intermediate steps, a discussion
about obfuscation and breaking the original single Con-
jecture into two separate ones: one for anti-concentration
and one for average case hardness.
We also follow a line similar to an earlier result [18]. Com-
pared to that result our proof does not assign specific
numbers to the parameters of the conjectures, but states
them in a parametrised fashion.
The following proof holds for a verification scheme ac-
cording to Def. 4. In the case of a verification scheme of
Def. 3 the same proof holds, replacing varPost with var
and setting qnsy(y = 0) = 1.
Proof of Theorem 3. If we can classically sample from
qnsy(x, y) (which means that our quantum computer
could be a classical impostor), then estimating the prob-
abilities of the distribution with exponential accuracy
is in #P : We can construct a polynomial time non-
deterministic Turing machine that uses the sampler as
an oracle that accepts when a specific string is sampled,
so that the probability of that event could be estimated,
if we could count the accepting branches. We could also
estimate the marginal probabilities qnsy(y) in such a man-
ner. Notice that we could not apply the same argument
for the quantum sampler since we cannot extract its ran-
domness as input to build the oracle. From Stockmeyer’s
theorem [45], there exists an FBPPNP machine that can
compute explicitly the values papx(x, y), such that for ev-
ery x, y
|papx(x, y)− qnsy(x, y)| ≤ q
nsy(x, y)
poly(N)
. (17)
The same can be applied in calculating the marginals.
Thus a FBPPNP machine can calculate qnsy(y = 0),
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the probability of accepting the syndrome measurements,
with accuracy of the same scaling as the joint probability.
Using the fact that qnsy(y = 0) is non-zero (it is lower
bounded by (1− )N , so one can get a non-zero estimate
in #P and approximate it using Stockmeyer) it is easy
to prove that for conditional probabilities,
|papx(x|y = 0)− qnsy(x|y = 0)| ≤ q
nsy(x|y = 0)
poly(N)
. (18)
Applying the triangle inequality, for every x the distance
between the values papx(x|y = 0) and the exact condi-
tional probability qexc(x|y = 0) of the Ising sampler is
|papx(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)|
≤ |papx(x|y = 0)− qnsy(x|y = 0)|
+|qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)|
≤ q
nsy(x|y = 0)
poly(N)
+ |qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)|.(19)
Assuming an (ε′, ε)-sound verification scheme has ac-
cepted, it follows that |qnsy(x|y = 0) − qexc(x|y = 0)| ≤
2ε, with confidence ε′.
Obfuscation of the probability estimated in this model
comes by construction. We can pick a computational
branch (x1, . . . , xm(n−1)) and final layer output string
(xn, . . . , xmn) to estimate at random, without revealing
any information to the sampler. This is possible because
the uniform distribution over branches (see Section IV B)
is created within a fixed instance of the Ising sampler,
with no extra input provided to the sampler. This is in
contrast to other models (e.g. [28]) where extra encryp-
tion is needed to hide from the sampler which probability
we are interested in. The expectation of varPost over the
uniform distribution on x is ≤ 2ε2mn , where m,n are the
dimensions of the logical ‘extended’ brickwork state and
N = mn.
Markov inequality relates the probability of a random
variable exceeding a certain value with its expectation.
For a random variable X and γ > 0,
prob(X ≥ γ) ≤ E(X)
γ
. (20)
Applying the Markov inequality to the second term in
Eqn. (19)
prob(|qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)| ≥ γ) ≤ 2ε
2Nγ
. (21)
By changing variables
prob
(
|qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)| ≥ 2ε
2Nγ
)
≤ γ
or
prob
(
|qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)| ≤ 2ε
2Nγ
)
≥ 1− γ.
(22)
Condensing this with Eqn. (19),
prob
(
|papx(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)| ≤
qexc(x|y = 0)
poly(N)
+
2ε(1 + o(1))
2Nγ
)
≥ 1− γ, (23)
Thus, for more than 1− γ fraction of instances of x
|papx(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)| ≤ q
exc(x|y = 0)
poly(N)
+
2ε(1 + o(1))
2mnγ
, (24)
which means that strongly simulating, i.e. calculating
the probabilities, of the Ising distribution with the above
mixture of additive and multiplicative accuracy for more
than 1− γ fraction of instances of x is in the third level
of the polynomial hierarchy.
We use the two conjectures to continue our proof. From
Eqn. (24) and Conjecture 2, setting ε1 ∈ 2ε(1+o(1))γα2 , there
must be at least β2 − γ fraction of instances of x (we
assume γ < β2) such that
|papx(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)| ≤ q
exc(x|y = 0)
poly(N)
+
ε1q
exc(x|y = 0),(25)
or
|papx(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)| ≤ (o(1) + ε1)qexc(x|y = 0).
Let Conjecture 1 hold with β1 ≥ 1− (β2 − γ) + 2−N and
α1 ∈ o(1) + ε1. These imply for the soundness parameter
ε ≤ (β1 + β2 − 1− 2
−N )α2α1
2
, (26)
which is positive for β1 + β2 − 2−N ≥ 1.
Then, there exists at least one instance for which the
multiplicative approximation the FBPPNP Stockmeyer
machine have calculated is #P -hard.
Then, PH ⊆ P#P ⊆ PFBPPNP ⊆ ΣP3 , where the first
inclusion is given by Toda’s theorem, and the polynomial
hierarchy collapses to the third level, an event expected
to be highly unlikely.
Our average case conjecture is implicitly contained in a
more general conjecture that includes anti-concetration
in [20]. Notice that our average case conjecture, however,
applies to a slightly different distribution. The difference
is that, in our case, we can have extra rotations on some
of the measurement angles, as a consequence of not ap-
plying the correction gates conditioned on the measure-
ment outcome of the teleportation step of the FT gates
(Fig. 10 (ii)). This issue will affect the implementation of
15
the measurements with non-zero angles in the extended
brickwork state (Figure 1 (ii)). Assuming magic |+pi/8〉
states are used for the implementation of the pi/8 rota-
tions (
√
T gates), the byproduct is a k0pi/4 rotation on
the measurements of the brickwork state vertices (Figure
1 (i)), for some k0 which depends on the measurement
outcomes of the magic state teleportation steps. The orig-
inal argument made in [20] to support their average case
conjecture is that for random measurement outcomes of
the vertices of the extended brickwork state, a uniform
rotation over the 8 different {kpi/4} angles is produced
on the brickwork state. In our case it is the same, because
the extra rotations cannot change the uniformity of these
angles. Thus, the computation applied is based on a ran-
dom brickwork MBQC pattern and connections to the
random circuit model, such as in [17], can be made. In
the latter paper, the average hardness of sampling from
a random circuit is supported by drawing connections to
quantum chaos and some numerical evidence.
VII. DISCUSSIONS
Quantum computational supremacy demonstration is be-
lieved to be easier than universal quantum computing
since it may not have to fulfil atleast one of DiVin-
cenzo’s criteria. Our work shows that fault-tolerant ver-
ifiable quantum supremacy is quantitatively easier than
fault-tolerant universal quantum computation in terms of
thresholds. This relies on combining the notion of post-
selected thresholds with trap-based verification which
allows error-detection-based fault tolerance to combat
noise. Such a combination is not known to exist for other
quantum verification methods. In the trap-based verifica-
tion schemes we use, it is the isolatable nature of the traps
that enables error-detection-based fault tolerance.
The techniques developed here have a wide range of ap-
plicability. We apply it to the Ising sampler as a spe-
cific example of a model for quantum supremacy. For
example, they could be applied in implementations of
the Boson Sampling model [19] in a fault-tolerant quan-
tum computer based on qubits [46]. Our methods should
also apply to the random circuit IQP model [47] which,
in the ‘graph program’ implementation [48] requires a
smaller than the Ising sampler, but non-planar, resource
state. Finally, it can be applied to recently studied quan-
tum supremacy architectures on low-periodicity planar
lattices [23]. The only requirement for our isolated trap
computation technique is that the underlying graph state
is bipartite. Thus, it can even be used to simplify the
original verification protocol [31] for a universal quantum
computer, in the case it runs a classical output problem,
and use our technique to implement it in a fault-tolerant
way.
Trap-based techniques require blindness, which is not
believed possible with a classical verifier [49, 50]. Even
verification protocols that do not require blindness, such
as [51], still need some level of quantum encryption. This
is true for any protocol based on quantum authentication
schemes [52], made possible by a quantum verifier. Verifi-
cation protocols with classical verifiers exist [48, 53, 54],
but require extra assumptions such as additional com-
putational hardness conjectures or non-communicating
provers respectively. For general reviews of blind and ver-
ifiable protocols see Refs. [55, 56].
Our work is one of the first on fault-tolerant verification,
which was known to be a challenging open question. An-
other recent progress [57] presents a fault-tolerant veri-
fication technique for universal MBQC that requires the
verifier to perform measurements, as opposed to prepa-
rations as in our scheme. Our scheme is complementary
to contemperaneous work on composable verification of
IQP, which is a classical hypothesis test with the verifier
preparing perfect stabilizer states and the prover using
a non-planar graph [58]. A formal proof of composabil-
ity of our protocol is a desirable next step and may be
developed using the methods given in [59].
A direction for future investigation should be the po-
tential of other known fault-tolerant quantum codes in
providing improved post-selected thresholds, as well as
the search for quantum codes for non-universal models.
Another direction should be the study of known quan-
tum supremacy models whose verification lies with the
model [60], as well as the development of such new non-
universal models. More technically, an open problem for
our verification scheme is to find a graph state with local
rotations being only multiples of pi/4 and still generate
random universal logical measurement angles as in the
existing scheme. This will make the fault-tolerant version
easier because it will be based on more standard magic
states. Also, other universal constructions with xy-plane
measurements can also be considered [61, 62].
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Appendix A: Bridge and break operators and the Ising Sampler
To understand the procedure of carving a specific graph out of a square lattice state by using only xy-plane measure-
ments, we explain two types of operations originally introduced in [31, 63].
The first is break operators. Let i be a vertex we want to remove from the original graph, together with the connection
to its neighbours. One can achieve this by performing a Pauli Z measurement on the qubit that corresponds to i and
discard the outcome. However, we do not have the power to perform measurements out of the xy-plane in our protocol,
otherwise we risk revealing the position of the traps by asking the prover to change the basis. Pauli Z-measurements
can be simulated by preparing dummy qubits in the |0〉 state. Then,the cZ gate applied by the prover has no effect
in entangling it with its neighbours. The measurement can have any arbitrary rotation since the qubit is isolated and
does not participate in the computation. In order to keep the whole procedure blind we instead prepare the qubit in
state |di〉 for di chosen independently and uniformly at random from {0, 1}. This ensures that the state is identical
to the maximally mixed state, as is the case for the other qubits in a blind protocol. Also, we apply on each of its
neighbours Pauli operation Zdi , before sending them to the prover, so that we cancel the effect that the prover’s
entangling will have on that neighbour.
The second is called bridge operators. Let i be a vertex of degree 2 that we want to remove in the original graph
and join its neighbours by an new edge. To achieve this we apply a Pauli Y measurement (measurement angle pi/2)
on the qubit that corresponds to vertex i and add pi/2 on the angles of each the two neighbours. Conditioned on
this measurement giving 0 the resulting graph, when we trace out the measured qubit, is the desired one. If the
measurement outcome is 1 then, in order to get the correct graph, we need to apply a Z correction on the neighbours.
Since our Ising sampler model is nonadaptive and all our measurements are in the xy plane we can achieve this by
flipping the measurement outcomes of the corresponding qubits. Notice that this is not an issue in the trap rounds
that we explain in Section IV A since there are no bridge operations in this case.
Appendix B: Proof of soundness in Theorem 1
Proof. Let UP (r,d) denote the correct unitary operation of the protocol. It includes everything preceding UB in
Figure (6), and we have only included in the arguments the random parameters that will be averaged over later.
The vector r contains as elements bits ri, r
′
i, where i ranges from 1 to (2κ + 1)N (2
2(2κ+1)N possible values) and
the vector d contains as elements bits di, where i ranges again from 1 to (2κ + 1)N (for the non-dummy qubits we
assume fixed di = 0, thus 2
κN possible values). The rest of the random parameters are the vector θ which contains
elements θi ∈ {0, pi8 , 2pi8 , . . . , 15pi8 } for 1 ≤ i ≤ (2κ + 1)N (16(2κ+1)N possible values) and the vector t which contains
the indices of the positions of the traps in all 2κ trap systems and takes all
(
2κ+1
κ
)
(κ+ 1) possible values allowed by
the construction. The distributions over all the possible values of the above random parameters are uniform.
In the honest case, after UP (r,d) is applied, the state of the trap system becomes ρt =
⊗
i∈t Z
ri |+〉i 〈+|i Zri , where
the index i takes values from the elements of t that represent the positions of the traps. In the dishonest case (again
based on Figure 6), tracing out the prover’s private system, the deviation UB becomes an arbitrary CPTP map
denoted by E . The probability of getting all zeros of the trap system ρ′t, right after the measurements, can be written
as
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F 2t ≡
∑
r,θ,t,d
p(r,θ, t,d)Tr
(⊗
i∈t
Zri |+〉i 〈+|i Zriρ′t
)
(B1)
=
∑
r,θ,t,d,b
pTr
⊗
i∈t
Zri |+〉i 〈+|i ZriTr{i:i/∈t}
⊗
i
Zbi |+〉i 〈+|i ZbiE
UP (r,d) ⊗
i/∈m(t)
|+〉i 〈+|i
⊗
i∈m(t)
|0〉i 〈0|i UP (r,d)†
⊗
i
|δi(θi, ri)〉 〈δi(θi, ri)|
)⊗
i
Zbi |+〉i 〈+|i Zbi
))
(B2)
where the inner trace in the formula is taken over all the systems except the trap system. The vector b has been
introduced, where elements bi are bits which correspond to the results of measurements of bits i for 1 ≤ i ≤ (2κ+1)N .
The probability p comes from the uniform distribution over all possible values of the random parameters and is
therefore 1/(22(2κ+1)N2κN16(2κ+1)N
(
2κ+1
κ
)
(κ+ 1)). Also, m(t) are the positions of the dummy qubits for a choice of
trap positions t.
Summing over θ’s creates the maximally mixed state for the δ’s and summing over the r’s and d’s of the computational
system and the dummy system creates the maximally mixed state for those systems. This is because just before the
application of deviation operator these systems are not entangled with the trap system and at the same time a
quantum one-time-pad is applied on them. We can therefore trace them out and update the CPTP map E to a new
CPTP map E ′ that applies on the remaining system (of dimension 2N ′) and does not depend on the secret parameters.
The CPTP map E ′ can be written as a Kraus decomposition, where the Kraus operators {Eu} obey
∑
uEuE
†
u = I2N′ ,
where I2N′ is the identity on a 2
N ′ dimension system. Each Kraus operator can be further decomposed into the Pauli
basis as Eu =
∑
k au,kPk, where {Pk} are all generalized elements of the Pauli basis applying on a 2N
′
dimension
system and {au,k} are complex coefficients. Also, we remind the reader that the φ parameters of the trap qubits are
all zero and therefore the remaining honest operation consists only of the rotations by the r parameters.
F 2t =
∑
rt,t,bt
p(rt, t)Tr
(∑
u
4N
′∑
k=1
4N
′∑
l=1
au,ka
∗
u,l
⊗
i∈t
Zri |+〉i 〈+|i Zri
⊗
i∈t
Zbi |+〉 〈+|ZbiPk|iZri |+〉i 〈+|i ZriPl|i
Zbi |+〉 〈+|Zbi
)
, (B3)
where Pk|i denotes the Pauli operator that applies on qubit with index i from the generalized Pauli basis operator
Pk. Because of the state of the system, in particular the fact that X |+〉 = |+〉, we can add ‘free’ Pauli X operators
randomized by new parameters r′ taken uniform at random.
F 2t =
∑
rt,r′t,t,bt
p(rt, r
′
t, t)Tr
(∑
u,k,l
au,ka
∗
u,l
⊗
i∈t
Zri |+〉i 〈+|i Zri
⊗
i∈t
Zbi |+〉 〈+|Xr′iZbiPk|iZriXr
′
i |+〉i 〈+|iXr
′
iZriPl|iZbi
Xr
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zbi
)
(B4)
By changing variables b′i = bi + ri and applying the cyclic property of the trace to move Z
riXr
′
i around
F 2t =
∑
rt,r′t,t,b
′
t
p(rt, r
′
t, t)Tr
(∑
u,k,l
au,ka
∗
u,l
⊗
i∈t
|+〉i 〈+|i
⊗
i∈t
Zb
′
i |+〉 〈+|Xr′iZb′i+riPk|iZriXr
′
i |+〉i 〈+|iXr
′
iZriPl|iZb
′
i+riXr
′
i
|+〉 〈+|Zb′i
)
(B5)
Applying the Pauli twirl lemma [64], proven in Appendix (E), by averaging over rt, r
′
t, we get
F 2t =
∑
t,b′t
p(t)
∑
u,k
|au,k|2
∏
i∈t
| 〈+|i Zb
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′iPk|i |+〉i |2
=
∑
t
p(t)
∑
k
|αk|2
∏
i∈t
| 〈+|i Pk|i |+〉i |2, (B6)
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where |αk|2 =
∑
u |au,k|2 and
∑
k |αk|2 = 1 from the unital property of the attack.
A similar analysis is applied to calculate the average fidelity Fc = F (ρc, ρ
′
c) of the computational state after the
measurements. In the honest case the computational state ρc just before the measurement will be disentangled from
the rest of the system:
⊗
i∈c Z
riXr
′
iRz(φi)X
r′i |G〉 〈G|⊗j∈cXr′jRz(−φj)Xr′jZrj , where c(t) are the positions of the
computational qubits for a choice of trap positions t and |G〉 〈G| is the computational graph state. The latter can be
expressed as EG
⊗
i∈c |+〉i 〈+|iE†G, where EG denotes all entangling operators cZ that apply on a graph G. In the
dishonest case, for an attack E the fidelity F¯c is
Fc ≡
∑
r,r′,θ,t,d
p(r, r′,θ, t,d)F (ρc, ρ′c)
=
∑
r,r′,θ,t,d
p(r, r′,θ, t,d)Tr
(
(ρcρ
′
c)
1/2
)
≥ Tr

 ∑
r,r′,θ,t,d
p(r, r′,θ, t,d)ρcρ′c
1/2

= Tr
 ∑
r,r′,θ,t,d,b
p
⊗
i∈c
ZriXr
′
iRz(φi)X
r′i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr′jZrjTr{i:i/∈c}
(⊗
i
Zbi |+〉i 〈+|i ZbiE(UP (r, r′,d)
⊗
i/∈m(t)
|+〉i 〈+|i
⊗
i∈m(t)
|0〉i 〈0|i UP (r, r′,d)†
⊗
i
|δi(θi, ri, r′i)〉 〈δi(θi, ri, r′i)|)
⊗
i
Zbi |+〉i 〈+|i Zbi
1/2
 . (B7)
Summing over the θ’s of the δ’s and the r’s and the d’s of the trap and the dummy system creates the maximally mixed
system for these systems which can be traced over. Expressing the attack on the remaining system (of dimension 2N
′
)
using the Kraus decomposition with each Kraus element decomposed in the Pauli basis we get as before
Fc ≥ Tr
(( ∑
t,rc(t),r
′
c(t)
,bc(t)
p
∑
u
4N
′∑
k=1
4N
′∑
l=1
au,ka
∗
u,l
⊗
i∈c
ZriXr
′
iRz(φi)X
r′i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr′jZrj
⊗
i∈c
Zbi |+〉 〈+|Zbi
Pk|iZriXr
′
iRz(φi)X
r′i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr′jZrjPl|jZbi |+〉 〈+|Zbi
)1/2)
. (B8)
By changing variables b′ = b+ r and applying the cyclic property of the trace
Fc ≥ Tr
(( ∑
t,rc(t),r
′
c(t)
,b′
c(t)
p
∑
u
4N
′∑
k=1
4N
′∑
l=1
au,ka
∗
u,l
⊗
i∈c
Xr
′
iRz(φi)X
r′i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr′j
⊗
i∈c
Zb
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′i+ri
Pk|iZriXr
′
iRz(φi)X
r′i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr′jZrjPl|jZb
′
i+ri |+〉 〈+|Zb′i
)1/2)
. (B9)
Using Corollary 1 in Appendix (E) and the cyclic property of the trace and sum over rc(t), we can eliminate all
Pauli X operators of the attack that differ in the two sides (we denote this by replacing the summation over l with
a summation over lx where the element Pl agrees with Pk on all the Pauli X components). We also use the cyclic
property of the trace to get
Fc ≥ Tr
(( ∑
t,rc(t),r
′
c(t)
,b′
c(t)
p
∑
u
∑
k
∑
lx
au,ka
∗
u,l 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr′j
⊗
i∈c
Zb
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′iPk|iXr
′
iRz(φi)
Xr
′
i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr′jPl|jZb
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′i
⊗
i∈c
Xr
′
iRz(φi)X
r′i |G〉
)1/2)
. (B10)
Then, the Xr
′
i (Xr
′
j ) operators that are next to |G〉 (〈G|) can be rewritten as Pauli Z operators on their neighbours,
which then commute with z rotations and the attack (since the Pauli X operators of the attack are the same from
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both sides) and with the projectors Zb
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′i , by changing variable b′′i = b′i + r′i, and cancel each other. The Xr
′
i
operators that are next to projectors Zb
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′i commute with them trivially
Fc ≥ Tr
(( ∑
t,r′
c(t)
,b′′
c(t)
p
∑
u
∑
k
∑
lx
au,ka
∗
u,l 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Rz(−φj)
⊗
i∈c
Zb
′′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′′i
Xr
′
jPk|iXr
′
iRz(φi) |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Rz(−φj)Xr′jPl|jXr
′
iZb
′′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′′i
⊗
i∈c
Rz(φi) |G〉
)1/2)
. (B11)
Then we can use again Corollary 1, but with Q, Q′ being Pauli Z+identity operators and {Pi} all tensor products
of Pauli X+identity operators, and sum over r′c(t) to eliminate the Pauli Z components of the attack the differ in
the two sides. Thus, given that
∑
u,k |au,k|2 = 1 from the unital property of the attack, the attack becomes a convex
combination of Pauli operators:
Fc ≥
( ∑
t,b′′
c(t)
p(t)
∑
u,k
|au,k|2|
⊗
i∈c(t)
〈+|iE†G
⊗
i∈c(t)
Rz(−φi)Zb′′i |+〉 〈+|Zb′′i Pk|iRz(φi)EG
⊗
i∈c(t)
|+〉i |2
)1/2
(B12)
The Pauli X component of Pk|i can be replaced by I since the only effect is, depending on b′′i , to change the sign
of the quantity inside the absolute and the sign is eliminated. Then, we can sum over the b’s to get identity and
since E†GRz(−φi) now commutes with the attack Pauli operators, it cancels with Rz(φi)EG. Also, as before, we set|αk|2 =
∑
u |au,k|2
F 2c ≥
∑
t
p(t)
∑
k
|αk|2
∏
i∈c(t)
| 〈+|i Pk|i |+〉i |2. (B13)
It is easy to see by the symmetry of the trap construction that, for attacks that are exactly the same on any of the
2κ + 1 graphs of the different the rounds of the protocol e.g. stochastic noise, Equation B6 and Equation B13 give
the same result when averaged over t. However, one needs to deal with more clever attacks which attack a different
qubit at every round trying to coincide with dummies instead of traps with non-zero probability, i.e. for some of the
possible permutations of the 2κ+ 1 graphs.
We now show that for κ ≥ 1 the maximum of F 2t − F 2c for all possible deviation strategies is
∆κ ≡ κ!(κ+ 1)!
(2κ+ 1)!
The attack is a convex combination of Pauli operators, thus it suffices to find the Pauli operator that maximizes
F 2t − F 2c . The maximum comes from the attack that touches all 2κ+ 1 rounds. In this case, F 2c is lower bounded by
0 and F 2t comes from the probability the attack does not coincide with any trap in the 2κ trap computation rounds.
There are 2κ+ 1 ways of picking the target computation round, which fixes the positions of the 2κ trap computation
rounds. The choice of the even/odd parity positions for the traps is fixed not to coincide with the attacks. Further
simplification can be done by observing that only the attacks on κ + 1 of the same kind (even or odd) and κ of the
other, are successful. By attacking κ+ 2 or more of the same kind they are guaranteed to hit a trap of the same kind,
independently of the position of the target. This reduces the possible ways of picking the target to κ+ 1, which gives
a bound of κ+1
(2κ+1κ )(κ+1)
, equal to the value of ∆κ above.
To conclude the proof we show that for all other attacks F 2t − F 2c is non-positive and thus estimating F 2c through
F 2t is a conservative estimation. We begin by arguing that there is no benefit for the attacker to touch more than
one qubit of each round, since the lower bound of the fidelity F 2c contains products of terms that can be 0 or 1 and
thus it suffices to make one term 0 to make the product 0. By symmetry of the construction it does not matter which
particular qubit the attacker touches but only whether it is an odd or even position qubit at each round. Let λ be the
number of rounds that are attacked.
Assume, without loss of generality, the first ξ rounds are attacked on an even qubit, where ξ ≤ κ otherwise it will
certainly hit a trap, and λ− ξ ≤ κ for the same reason. Also, assume ξ ≥ (λ− ξ) without loss of generality.
For index k to correspond to an attack on λ rounds
F 2c,k ≥ 1−
λ
2κ+ 1
=
2κ+ 1− λ
2κ+ 1
(B14)
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There are
(
2κ+1
κ
)
(κ + 1) possibilities for the selection of traps. In order to count the combinations of attacks not
affecting the traps, we identify two cases, (i) the target is in the attacked rounds (λ possible positions) and there are(
2κ+1−λ
κ−ξ
)
possible placings of the remaining traps in the non-attacked positions, (ii) the target is not in the attacked
rounds (2κ+1−λ possible positions) and there are (2κ−λκ−ξ ) possible placings of the remaining traps in the non-attacked
positions:
Ft,k =
λ
(
2κ+1−λ
κ−ξ
)
+ (2κ+ 1− λ)(2κ−λκ−ξ )(
2κ+1
κ
)
(κ+ 1)
(B15)
We show that for λ ≤ 2κ we have Ft,k − Fc,k ≤ 0.
λ
(
2κ+1−λ
κ−ξ
)
+ (2κ+ 1− λ)(2κ−λκ−ξ )(
2κ+1
κ
)
(κ+ 1)
− 2κ+ 1− λ
2κ+ 1
≤ 0⇔
(2κ− λ+ 1)(κ+ ξ + 1)(2κ−λκ−ξ )
(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1)(2κ+1κ )(κ+ 1) − 2κ+ 1− λ2κ+ 1 ≤ 0⇔
(2κ− λ+ 1)(κ+ ξ + 1)(2κ− λ)!(κ!)2
(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1)(2κ+ 1)!(κ− (λ− ξ))!(κ− ξ)! ≤
2κ+ 1− λ
2κ+ 1
⇔
(κ+ ξ + 1)(2κ− λ)!(κ!)2
(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1)(2κ)!(κ− (λ− ξ))!(κ− ξ)! ≤ 1 (B16)
For κ = {1, 2} it is easy to verify the expression directly. For the general case we rewrite the above as:
(κ+ ξ + 1)[(κ− ξ + 1) · . . . · κ][(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1) · . . . · κ]
(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1)(2κ− λ+ 1) · . . . · 2κ ≤ 1 (B17)
where we have 1 + ξ + (λ− ξ) = 1 + λ terms on the numerator and 1 + λ terms in the denominator.
For the LHS of the above equation we have
≤ (κ+ ξ + 1)
(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1)2ξ
≤ (κ+ ξ + 1)
(κ− ξ + 1)2ξ (B18)
It suffices to show that the above is ≤ 1 for all allowed values of κ and ξ. We can rewrite it as:
(κ+ ξ + 1)
(κ− ξ + 1) ≤ 2
ξ ⇔ (B19)
1
ln(2)
ln(
κ+ 1 + ξ
κ+ 1− ξ ) ≤ ξ ⇔ (B20)
2
ln(2)
artanh
(
ξ
κ+ 1
)
≤ ξ (B21)
which is true for κ ≥ 3, ξ ≤ κ. This concludes our calculation of the bound ∆κ.
The rest of the proof is given in the main text.
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Appendix C: Calculation of FT Threshold for Protocol 2b
Since the logical graph is the brickwork state, its topological implementation will look like Fig. (8).
Noise considered is local, unital and bounded. It applies after every elementary operation (preparation, entangling
and measurement) j and is expressed as a CPTP superoperator:
Nj = (1− )I + Ej (C1)
where ||Ej || = , where we set  = V = P to calculate a common threshold for the verifier and the prover.
For the fault tolerant noisy, but honest, probability distribution post-selected for null syndrome measurement
qnsy(x|y = 0), and the exact one qexc(x) we reproduce the derivation of Ref. [29].∑
x
|qnsy(x|y = 0)− pexc(x)| =
∑
x
∣∣∣∣Tr(PxQy(ρsparse + ρfaulty))Tr(Qy(ρsparse + ρfaulty)) − pexc(x)
∣∣∣∣
=
∑
x
∣∣∣∣ Tr(PxQyρfaulty)Tr(Qy(ρsparse + ρfaulty)) − (1− b)pexc(x)
∣∣∣∣ (C2)
Here, Px is the projector to result x for the output register and Qy is the projector to null syndrome for the post-
selection register. ρfaulty is the un-normalised state of the noisy sampler with the noise operators that produce an error
in the output distribution and operator ρsparse is is the un-normalised state with the noise operators do not produce
an error in the output distribution when the syndromes give a null result (for more detail see [29]). b is defined
b =
Tr(PxQyρsparse)
Tr(Qyρsparse + ρfaulty)qexc(x)
. (C3)
By applying triangle inequality and by observing that the trace terms are positive∑
x
|qnsy(x|y = 0)− pexc(x)| ≤ Tr(Qyρfaulty)
Tr(Qy(ρsparse + ρfaulty))
+ (1− b)
Since
∑
x
Tr(PxQy(ρsparse+ρfaulty))
Tr(Qy(ρsparse+ρfaulty))
= 1, we have 1− b = Tr(Qyρfaulty)Tr(Qy(ρsparse+ρfaulty)) .
Also we have Tr(Qy(ρsparse + ρfaulty)) > (1− )N . Thus
∑
x
|qnsy(x|y = 0)− pexc(x)| ≤ 2Tr(ρfaulty)/(1− )N (C4)
In the case of the topological code the errors are created by error chains L of length greater than Ld, which is the
minimum of the distance between two defects and the size of defects. So
Tr(ρfaulty) ≤
N∑
L=Ld
∑
L:|L|=L
Tr(ρLfaulty)
≤
N∑
L=Ld
∑
L:|L|=L
(1− )N
L∏
j=1
||Ej ||
1− 
≤
N∑
L=Ld
∑
L:|L|=L
(1− )N
(

1− 
)|L|
(C5)
The number of error chains of length |L| in the 3D lattice of size n is poly(n)(6/5)5|L|, which is the number of self
avoiding walks [65]. Thus the gap
∑
x |qnsy(x|y = 0)− pexc(x)| is bounded by
≤ 2
N∑
L=d
poly(N)(6/5)5L
(

1− 
)L
(C6)
which converges to zero if /(1− ) < 1/5. The threshold comes from the self-avoiding walks that affect the singular
qubits and surpass the distillation threshold, where a more careful counting needs to be done [29] to get /(1−) < 0.134
or  < 0.118.
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However, the above calculation is under the stochastic phenomenological noise model that does not account for
the noise in the individual operations that compose a syndrome measurement. In our case, the topological code is
implemented on the MBQC model where physical noise should be at least 6 times less than phenomenological noise.
This is because there are typically 6 operations involved in a syndrome measurement: 1 syndrome qubit preparation,
4 entangling operations with the surrounding qubits (less on boundaries) and 1 syndrome measurement. This gives
us threshold thres = 0.0196943.
The overhead of the error detection scheme comes by counting the number of error syndromes that are influencing
one trap by catching potentially detectable errors (chains of size ≤ d). This is the area of dimension d around the
defect qubits and their ‘past’ in terms of MBQC flow (physical layer) which we choose in the smallest of the three
dimensions of the topological code. We take the biggest (in terms of physical qubits) trap of Fig. (8). The number of
syndrome measurements (cubes) will depend on the distance parameter d. Since the counting of syndromes is involved
we give an example for fixed values, d = 2 and physical noise  = (1/20)thres. In this case the number of syndromes
is a most 564 and the number of repetitions is M = 1/(1 − pc)564, where pc is the probability of a cube syndrome
failing. Probability pc is given by (1− (1 − 2(6))6)/2. This gives M ≈ 3 × 108. Overheads for other fractions of the
threshold for noise appear in the main text.
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 2 soundness
Proof. To establish soundness we need to show that a lower bound in the fidelity on the target computation round
and the acceptance probability of the trap computation rounds are the same averaged over the random parameters.
The total variation distance between the experimental (noisy and potentially dishonest) distribution of the Ising
sampler qnsy(x|y = 0), where y = 0 implies conditioning on the null syndrome, and the exact one qexc(x|y = 0) =
qexc(x) after the measurements is
varPost =
1
2
∑
x
|qexc(x|y = 0)− qnsy(x|y = 0)| = 1
2
∑
x
∣∣∣∣qexc(x)− qnsy(x, y = 0)qnsy(y = 0)
∣∣∣∣
= D
(
ρc,
ρ
′post
c
qnsy(y = 0)
)
≤
√√√√1− F 2(ρc, ρ′postc
qnsy(y = 0)
)
=
√√√√√1− Tr2
√ ρcρ′postc
qnsy(y = 0)
, (D1)
where ρc is the correct state and ρ
′post
c the experimental state, post-selected on the null syndrome measurements,
after all measurements. For the rest of this section we denote qnsy(y = 0) as q′0 for simplicity.
For the target round, the average fidelity Fc is calculated in the physical level of the computation as in the non-fault-
tolerant case. The qubits are pre-rotated by θi, or flipped by di in the case of dummies.
Noise can enter either during the state preparation from the verifier, or during the single round elementary MBQC
operations (entangling and measurement) of the prover. We assume a noise model which is local, unital and bounded,
so that standard fault tolerance techniques are applicable. Noise can always moved after every elementary operation
on qubit j and expressed as a CPTP superoperator applies only on the state of qubit j:
Nj = (1− )I + Ej (D2)
where ||Ej || ≤ thres.
Crucially, we assume that the noise during the preparation does not have any dependence on the secret parameter θi.
Moving all the noise operators just before the measurement, results to a different set of local, unital and bounded
operators N ′j , collectively represented as N ′.
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We apply the same twirling steps as in the proof of Theorem 1 to twirl the CPTP map that is the composition of the
attack and the noise. Notice that the twirl on the post-selected qubits is trivial since there is no sum over b′i. Thus,
F 2c
(
ρpostc ,
ρ
′post
c
q′0
)
≥ (D3)
1
q′0
∑
t,b′
c(t)
p(t)
∑
u,k
|au,k|2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊗
i∈c(t)
〈0|i
⊗
i∈c(t)
〈+|iE†G
⊗
i∈c(t)
Rz(−φi)Zb′i |+〉i 〈+|i Zb
′
iPk|iRz(φi)EG
⊗
i∈c(t)
|+〉i
⊗
i∈c(t)
|0〉i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
where b′i’s take fixed values in the sum for the syndrome measurements such that the syndrome indicates null errors.
The only (noise and attack) Pauli operators that have an effect on the above quantity are tensor products of identity
and Pauli Z. These operators flip the measurement outcome of the particular qubit. Detectable attacks disappear
because of the projector to null syndromes. The undetected attacks that come from operators Pk|i can be written
as logical bit flips on the subsequent measurements - since it will affect the classical post-processing. Also, the
normalization factor vanishes when we trace over the syndrome systems.
Therefore, at the logical level
F 2c ≥ (D4)∑
t,b′′
c(t)
p(t)
∑
u,k
|au,k|2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊗
i∈c(t)
〈0|Li
⊗
i∈c(t)
〈+|Li E†LG
⊗
i∈c(t)
Rz(−φLi )Zb
′′
i L |+〉L 〈+|L Zb′′i LPLk|iRz(φLi )ELG
⊗
i∈c(t)
|+〉Li
⊗
i∈c(t)
|0〉Li
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
We can now sum over the index b′′c(t) to simplify the expression, by cancelling also the rotation and entangling
operators. On the logical dummy system the logical Pauli Z attacks have no effect, therefore it has trace 1 and can
be simplified to
F 2c ≥
∑
t
p(t)
∑
u,k
|au,k|2
∏
i∈c(t)
| 〈+|Li PLk|i |+〉Li |2. (D5)
The same technique can be employed for the trap rounds, with the difference that instead of post-selection there is
error correction for Protocol 2a and error detection for Protocol 2b that results in the same logical state for the same
(noise and attack) Pauli operators.
From completeness we have set the limit of acceptance of the fidelity estimate to (1 − 2′′). By repeating N =
log(1/β)/(2′′2) times gets us
√
′′-close in our estimation with confidence 1 − β. Thus, with this confidence we get
bound varPost ≤ √3′′ + ∆κ.
Appendix E: Channel Twirl Lemma
The following lemma is used in the verifiability proofs.
Lemma 1.
4n∑
i=1
PiQPiρPiQ
′Pi = 0, if Q 6= Q′ (E1)
where ρ is a matrix of dimension 2n × 2n, Q, Q′ are two arbitrary n-fold tensor products of Pauli+identity operators
{I,X, Y, Z}, and {Pi} is the set of all n-fold tensor products of Pauli operators and the identity {I,X, Y, Z}.
A proof of this lemma is also provided in Ref. [64].
Proof. We can write Q as ZaXa′ = Z
a1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ ZanXa′1 ⊗ . . . ⊗Xa′n , for arbitrary binary vectors a = (a1, . . . , an),
a′ = (a′1, . . . , a
′
n), and similarly Q
′ = ZbXb′ . Assuming Q 6= Q′, either a 6= b or a′ 6= b′. Summing over all Pk,k′ ’s
which are the n-fold tensor products of the form ZkXk′ = Z
k′1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Zk′nXk1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Xkn for binary vectors
k = (k1, . . . , kn),k
′ = (k′1, . . . , k
′
n), we get
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∑
k,k′
Pk,k′QPk,k′ρPk,k′Q
′Pk,k′
=
∑
k,k′
ZkXk′ZaXa′ZkXk′ρZkXk′ZbXb′ZkXk′
=
∑
k,k′
Zk(Xk′ZaXk′)Xa′ZkρZk(Xk′ZbXk′)Xb′Zk
=
∑
k,k′
Zk((−1)k′·aZa)Xa′ZkρZk((−1)k′·bZb)Xb′Zk
=
∑
k,k′
(−1)k′·(a⊕b)Za(ZkXa′Zk)ρZb(ZkXb′Zk)
=
∑
k′
(−1)k′·(a⊕b)
∑
k
(−1)k·(a′⊕b′)ZaXa′ρZbXb′
If either a 6= b or a′ 6= b′ the summation ∑k′((−1)k′·(a⊕b)) or ∑k((−1)k·(a′⊕b′)) is equal to zero respectively,
because (in either case) exactly half of the elements of the summation will be −1 and half will be 1. Therefore, since
our assumption was that either a 6= b or a′ 6= b′ or both, the whole expression equals zero.
Corollary 1.
2n∑
i=1
PiQPiρPiQ
′Pi = 0, if Q 6= Q′ (E2)
where ρ is a matrix of dimension 2n × 2n, Q, Q′ are two arbitrary n-fold tensor products of Pauli X and identity
operators {I,X}, and {Pi} is the set of all n-fold tensor products of Pauli Z and identity operators {I, Z}.
Proof. Since Q 6= Q′, Lemma 1 gives
4n∑
i=1
PiQPiρPiQ
′Pi = 0 (E3)
where {Pi} is the set of all n-fold tensor products of the Pauli operators and the identity {I,X, Y, Z}. But since Q
and Q′ have only identity and Pauli X tensor elements the Pauli X operators of {Pi} commute with Q and Q′ on
each side and give identity.
